Public Matters blog

I wrote an article not long ago about some of the upcoming changes to the Clery Act, which requires institutions of higher learning to disclose information about crime on its campuses. The most significant changes include requiring schools to have security plans and conduct security drills, publish how they notify students during an emergency, and specifically report hate crimes.

By October 1 of each year, institutions must publish and distribute their Annual Campus Security Report to current and prospective students and employees. This report is required to provide crime statistics for the prior three years, policy statements regarding various safety and security measures, campus crime prevention program descriptions, and procedures to be followed in the investigation and prosecution of alleged sex offenses (thank you Wikipedia).

BUT, I just read a really interesting blog in the Huffington Post that these types of laws don’t do enough to ensure that students are actually safer. As a matter of fact, this article claims that the Clery Act, combined with another federal law, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, actually prevents schools from disclosing information that identifies a student involved in a crime.

Because campus disciplinary proceedings result in records that identify students and are maintained by an institution, and because those records are not in the possession of campus security, federal law can be interpreted as preventing the school from disclosing the specifics of what goes on in these proceedings.

So, as this author points out, when a crime occurs the school is required to report the incident, but also can’t legally reveal the identification of the student to the public, which I think is actually jeopardizing student safety.

While I understand the reasoning behind the law, that schools can’t publicly expose someone who hasn’t been convicted of a crime, from a student perspective wouldn’t you want to know that the person sitting next to you in class is accused of a serious crime? The most significant issue that this blog highlights is that schools aren’t legally required to report the findings of such crimes to the public, good or bad, and that is not in the best interest of the safety of students.

If someone is accused of sexual assault, we need to know if they are guilty. We also need to know if they were wrongly accused. And we cannot leave that responsibility to a panel of people who have no obligation to report their findings to the public, or even to be right in their outcome.

Perhaps we’re all experiencing a little Olympic withdrawal, because our article on Honeywell auctioning off the security equipment used to protect the Olympic games was a hot story on our newswire this week. It’s a cool story, I’ll admit, especially when you see the numbers:

Honeywell Building Solutions is beginning the final stage of its $30 million security contract with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police here: the removal of all the equipment that’s been installed to protect the 18 Olympic venues. But what to do with the roughly 1,300 Panasonic IP cameras, Computar lenses, 4,000 Xtralis PIRs, etc.

Although, $30 million is a minor expenditure compared to the $1 billion overall security tab that the Olympics racked up. But according to this article in the Vancouver Sun, Canadians are mixed about the departure of this equipment. Here’s the lead graph (which in good journalism would be the basis of the rest of the article, but apparently not at the Vancouver Sun):

With the end of the Olympics, 1,000 or so Games-related surveillance cameras are being removed from Vancouver streets, sparking calls to keep them.

That’s the only mention in this article that anyone would ever want more security cameras because, after all, it’s just Big Brother “recording our every unconscious nose-pick or bum-scratch.” (That’s in there, for real.)

Actually, you would think Canadians were rioting in the streets trying to have the equipment removed based on the headline:

Good riddance to Olympic security cameras
Living in a democracy is about being able to feel free, not watched, whenever you leave your home and walk down the street

Um, pretty sure there’s no expectation of privacy on public streets and as the article itself points out there are already 2,000 private cameras monitoring the downtown area. I don’t get it. If there are already all these cameras monitoring public streets, why would this article so blatantly say having additional cameras is an effort to take away the freedom of its citizens?

And, the article continues, it’s not like cameras actually make us any safer:

there doesn’t seem to be any significant effect on crime rates from these cameras and the cost-benefit analysis numbers are very dodgy.

If surveillance cameras eliminated crime there would be no bank robberies, convenience store stickups or jewelry store heists.

I think the biggest point this article misses is that there were no major security incidents at the Olympics. Sure, there wasn’t enough snow and some broken Zambonis, but there were no huge security issues. Other than some demonstrating that turned into rioting, it was pretty quiet, security-wise (well, that the public knows about anyway). But, no terrorist attacks and no real violence. Well, that means security was a success and was worth every penny, right? If you’re in the security industry you know the mainstream media would never, ever, ever come out and say that. After all, it’s only the bad stuff, the where-was-security stories that make the news.

Again, this really just confirms the security industry’s biggest issue: You can’t necessarily prove that having cameras and high-levels of security in place stopped any incidents from happening.

Oh, and just for your reading enjoyment, no article like this would ever be complete without a 1984 reference, right?

George Orwell’s fictional world in 1984 is a perfect example and I can think of no more eloquent argument against the indiscriminate use of surveillance.

That is what is wrong with the push to add more cameras downtown.

Guns have been everywhere in the news lately. No sooner had I posted a blog about the Supreme Court considering overturning a 28-year-old handgun ban in Chicago, than I read this article about Starbucks allowing handguns in its stores. I posted a Tweet about how permitting customers to enter its stores with handguns doesn’t seem like a very sound security program, and got at least one Tweet response basically accusing me of wanting to take away people’s second amendment rights (that Tweet has since disappeared, so you’ll just have to take my word for it).

First of all, I don’t think private corporations restricting people from carrying weapons inside their facility is unconstitutional, I think it’s smart. I’m not a constitutional lawyer, obviously, but private corporations have the right to keep guns out of their facilities. Frankly, I would think this kind of change in policy would strike fear in the hearts of security practitioners. And I’m surprised more of you aren’t willing to talk about it. I’ve put out at least 12 phone calls on this issue and have only gotten one “spokesperson” to comment. (If you’d like to comment, please send me an email: LStelter@securitydirectornews.com or call me: 207.846.0600 x227)

And then this morning, one of the top stories of the day is the shooting of two Pentagon police officers. Granted, shootings happen every day, but do we really think the solution is to allow and encourage more people to carry weapons?

CFATS legislation took some movement forward today during a hearing in front of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. There’s not a lot of press on it yet, but I’m expecting some good synopsis from the Chemical Facility Security News blog.

If you’d like to watch it for yourself, here’s the full video.

And now that we’re all social media wizards, I expect you would be interested in following some of the comments from the those Tweeting on the floor:

CFATS
ChemSecurity
GP_Mae
Socma

I recently posted a story about how the New Hampshire considering legislation that would effectively ban the use of biometrics. The representative who introduced the bill said he had major privacy concerns about the use of biometrics and the way personal information (i.e. your fingerprints, iris’s and other biometric elements) were stored and distributed.

Many in the security industry believe that biometrics will be one of the most critical technologies deployed and fear that such legislation could jeopardize its growth and adoption as a security tool. They argue that biometric information is highly secure and difficult (if not impossible) to reproduce.

Well, that may not be exactly true, according to this CNN article, anyway. Hackers demonstrated how they could forge the biometric information in a passport so that “Elvis Presley” (accurate photo and all) could get cleared through an automated passport scanning system being tested at Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport (the same airport the Christmas day bomber went through, mind you).

“What we did for that chip is create passport content for Elvis Presley and put it on a chip and sign it with our own key for a non-existent country. And a device that was used to read chips didn’t check the country’s signatures.”

The problem, in part, is that each country has its own security signature for verifying its own biometric passports. While some share that information, many countries do not, making it easy to exploit the loopholes.

The fact that this use of biometrics has 100 percent possibility of fraud is not exactly a figure people in the security industry want to hear. I still argue that there are too many automated procedures in airports and while there’s certainly plenty of human error happening, at least there’s a chance someone can recognize such fraudulent documents? Or perhaps that’s just wishful thinking.

I’m not sure if this article is amusing or just pathetic, but apparently the agency that is charged with our national security has a hard time keeping tabs on its own weapons.

Agents and officers of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security reported that 289 of their handguns, shotguns or automatic rifles had been lost or stolen between 2005 and 2008

Actually, that didn’t seem too bad to me, especially over the course of three years, but I found some of the ways that officers lost weapons to be fairly amusing. Apparently, weapons were left in places ranging from fast-food restaurant restrooms to bowling alleys to clothing stores.

I can just imagine how some of those conversations went down:

Boss: Where’s your weapon, officer?
Officer: Um, I can’t find it.
Boss: What do you mean you can’t find it?
Officer: Well, I went bowling with the kids last night and must have left my gun on the scoring table because it was really interfering with my follow through.
Boss: Well, these things happen. Go get yourself another one.

I think that’s funny (although it could be due to the cold medicine), but DHS isn’t laughing.

“Although some reported losses were beyond the officers’ control, most losses occurred because officers did not properly secure firearms,” said DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner in a 23-page report dated Jan. 25. “The Department of Homeland Security, through its components, did not adequately safeguard and control its firearms.”

But this issue apparently isn’t just relegated to DHS.

While the report was embarrassing for DHS, other unidentified federal law enforcement agencies fared worse. Skinner said the Justice Department and the Government Accountability Office, Congress’s audit arm, found similar problems among 18 agencies assessed between 2003 and 2007.

I’m guessing a lot of these folks are military or former law enforcement officers (or at least have been trained and certified to carry guns) so they should know how to keep track of their weapons, right? Perhaps it is true that those government jobs make you soft.

I am so disturbed and shocked by this article that I had to share it. KOMO News out of Seattle is reporting that a 15-year-old girl was viciously attacked in the Seattle Downtown Bus Tunnel while nearby security guards stood by and watched. According to the article, the officers said they are restricted by the transit authority’s policy that restricts them from intervening in such situations. While these officers did radio for police assistance, they allowed the attack to happen.

Disgraceful, absolutely disgraceful.

First of all, I’m sure these officers were following the letter of the law and I’m sure that, politically, that policy is there to protect the agency from liability. But, this scenario is incredibly damaging to the public’s confidence. It sends the message that security is worthless, they’re just bystanders and unable to offer any additional support and have no authority beyond the average citizen (except to ticket or fine you). As a matter of fact, they’re actually restricted from helping people. I bet there’s a lot of citizens out there who, if they had witnessed this situation, would’ve jumped in to stop it.

And, worse yet, this policy is actually causing a false sense of security. When I see someone in uniform, I assume that if something were to happen, they would help. That’s their job, right?

As a result of this incident, the agency is considering changing it’s policy. No kidding, huh? They’re also debating whether or not to change a similar policy restricting bus drivers from intervening. Here’s a similar crazy situation:

Two years ago, a bus driver wrestled a gunman to the ground and held him until police came. “Metro’s reaction was to threaten to suspend the driver for intervening, while at the same time the police department and the county council were putting together awards for this gentleman,” said Paul Bachtel, president of Metro Bus Driver’s Union, Local 587. “Metro quickly backed off, but did put a letter in his file advising him not to intervene in the future.”

However, I think there’s a big difference between allowing bus drivers to intervene and security officers. Bus drivers are just suppose to drive the bus and shouldn’t be charged with mitigating situations - that’s security’s job. Therefore, it’s pretty important for the transit authority to give security the power to act, don’t you think? Good grief, who’s in charge here?

Generally, I think the mainstream media is a little too critical of the TSA. I don’t know if I just have a soft spot for an overburdened organization with no official leadership trying to keep millions of people safe while not offending anyone, but now I think they’re just full of it.

I just read this story in USA Today about how the TSA is now conducting secondary bomb screening in airports.

Airport screeners for the first time will begin roving through airports taking chemical swabs from passengers and their bags to check for explosives, the Transportation Security Administration said Tuesday.

What? They’ve been doing this for at least a year now. In March of 2009, the TSA made a very similar announcement that they were beginning secondary gate screening.

And, they certainly didn’t just start this practice this week. I just blogged about how I got bomb swabbed at the Portland Jetport and I’m pretty sure that PWM is not one of the five airports where this program was being tested, despite its extensive 11-gate, single concourse status.

So, is the TSA really just making this up? I read through the article a few times, trying to see if I was missing something, but it sounds like the exact same announcement. Perhaps the “news” is about the portability of the machines, but the machine described in the article sounds very similar to what was used on me.

I guess I don’t blame the TSA for using the mainstream media to appease the public and ensure travelers that they’re putting additional security measures in place, but don’t make it sound new. It’s not.

When it comes to technological advancements, ports tend to have a lot of the latest and greatest. Many have those mega-video walls in their command and control centers that allow them to track ships as they come into the port, sophisticated land and water radar systems, video surveillance that allows them to see miles, and even robotic cameras to monitor what’s happening in the water. I’ve been fortunate enough to see some of these technologies in action (check out the video from my tour of the Port of Long Beach) and let me just tell you: It’s cool. And, I’m sure there’s even cooler stuff they don’t let us journalists (or the public) know about.

And, it just keeps getting better. Here’s an article about some of the newest technologies being deployed at the POLB and Port of LA. These new security measures include a ship that can screen cargo vessels as they come into the port, a radiation detecting helicopter and a dog that can sniff chemical and biological weapons. Cool.

Apparently, the $3-million screening ship is the first of its kind in the world:

It can scan the contents of a ship through its hull as it is being escorted into port. The security ship can transmit the data to shore-based authorities. It also has a submersible rover that can search hulls for explosives in zero visibility conditions.

And even the dog seems pretty cool:

The sheriff’s department says he has one of the most highly trained noses ever. He can sniff out chemical agents at lower concentrations than any instruments. He’s also the only dog in the sheriff’s department with his own badge.

I can almost see all you port folks just salivating over this stuff. If you’re nice, maybe the California security guys will let you walk their new, cool dog.

I got away with not writing about aviation security for two whole weeks - that feels like a record. Well, if you were starting to miss the drama, rest assured, there’s always more to be worried about when it comes to securing airports. Frankly, I’m sort of shocked this story isn’t making bigger headlines. At first, I thought I had just missed it on the mainstream news, but after consulting with some of my more prolific TV-watching colleagues, I learned that they hadn’t heard a peep about this incident either (guess everybody would rather talk about the weather).

So, it all started when a man was found dead in the landing-gear compartment of a Delta Air Lines jet that flew to Tokyo’s Narita Airport from New York on Jan. 6. First of all, this man must not have been very bright or aware of the plane’s destination because spending 20 hours, 30,000 feet above the ground in 50 degree below zero temperatures with no oxygen, is, well not worth the free ride.

Anyway, the more pressing question is: How did this man manage to get in the plane in the first place? Obviously, tarmacs are considered secure areas of the airport. However, especially at a large airport like JFK, there are a lot of remote areas that may not be easily accessible, but may not be as well monitored as inside the airport, for example. Especially after the Newark incident, where it was found that cameras were not functioning properly, it seems likely that perimeter security may also have some similar challenges.

In this article, our friend Doug Laird expressed his own worries about this incident: “If a person can gain access to get in the wheel well, a person can gain access to plant a device on the airplane,” said Douglas R. Laird, a former Northwest Airlines Corp. security chief who is now president of consultant Laird & Associates Inc. in Reno, Nevada. “It’s a major concern.”

This incident will likely trigger a review of tarmac security procedures. I’m just waiting to see how long it takes for this to be all over the mainstream news. My guess is not until the storm blows over.