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by: Whit Richardson - Monday, July 16, 2012

G4S said it "deeply regrets" its failure to provide enough trained security personnel to staff the London Olympics, according to a statement from the company.

It's understandable that a workforce supply contract at this scale—G4S called it "unprecedented"—would be tough to fulfill. The unfortunate result, however, is that it's forced the UK government to call up an additional 3,500 soldiers, most of whom are just back from Afghanistan, to make up the difference.

"We are grateful for the additional military support. We do not underestimate the impact on the military personnel and their families and express our appreciation to them," G4S said in a statement.

G4S said it would swallow the cost of the increased military deployment, and said it was also "incurring other significant costs as it endeavours to meet the contract challenges." The company estimates it will incur a loss on the contract in the range of £35 million-£50 million.

by: Whit Richardson - Friday, June 29, 2012

The day after I post a story about the TSA firing eight of its agents at Newark's airport for sleeping on the job (the third batch of pink slips the TSA has handed out this month), news breaks today that the TSA has fired eight federal air marshals, including a supervisor, for drinking alcohol on the job.

The eight air marshals, based in the New York office, allegedly drank alcohol at a restaurant on a training day in February. None of the air marshals were scheduled to fly that day, but rules prohibit alcohol consumption any time they're on the clock, according to the Associated Press.

In addition to the eight fired air marshals, the TSA suspended six more for not reporting the incident, which was ultimately reported via a website where TSA employees can report inappropriate behavior, according to the AP. All of the affected air marshals can appeal the decision, except one who was on probation and terminated immediately, the AP reported.

The TSA issued its now well-known "zero tolerance" statement, which it has issued in the wake of past terminations: "TSA holds all of its employees to the highest professional and ethical standards and has zero tolerance for misconduct in the workplace. ... TSA's decision to remove the individuals involved in the misconduct affirms our strong commitment to the highest standards of conduct and accountability."

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by: Whit Richardson - Tuesday, May 22, 2012

John Pistole, administrator for the Transportation Security Administration, has admitted the TSA might not have been able to stop the most-recent underwear bomber with existing technology.

Following AQAP's failed plot to smuggle a new-and-improved underwear bomb aboard a U.S.-bound airplane, Jeffrey Goldberg, a columnist for Bloomberg and national correspondent for The Atlantic, asked Pistole whether the TSA's full-body scanners, now at 180 U.S. airports, would be able to detect such a device if terrorists were able to make one in the United States.

Pistole tactfully danced around the question. "The advanced imaging technology gives us the best chance to detect the underwear-type device," he told Goldberg, but admitted after a follow-up question that it "is not 100 percent guaranteed." Pistole continued:

“If it comes down to a terrorist who has a well-concealed device, and we have no intelligence about him, and he comes to an advanced-imaging technology machine, it is still our best technology. But it’s really an open question about whether the machine, or the AIT operator, would detect the device.”

What about a lo-tech, TSA pat-down? Also not a 100-percent guarantee, Pistole said.

Goldberg left the conversation "unconvinced that the TSA can keep up with advances in jihadist bomb-making."

In his column, Goldberg shares Bruce Schneier's sentiment that the recent foiled underwear-bomb plot (and Pistole's "calibrated answer") should, rather than be cited as a reason to increase airport security, be a strong argument against it. Instead, more focus and resources should be applied to discovering and dismantling plots before they reach the airport because, as Goldberg writes, "if the only thing standing between the bomber and his target is a TSA pat-down, bet on the bomber."

 

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by: Whit Richardson - Wednesday, May 16, 2012

Bruce Schneier makes a strong argument against the case for profiling at U.S. airports in his column for Forbes. In addition to believing profiling is a bad idea for a number of reasons—it's inaccurate, serves to alienate those "who are in the best position to discover and alert authorities about Muslim plots before the terrorists even get to the airport," and just plain wrong—he also argues that "it actually puts us all at risk."

Past events have proven that terrorists come in all shapes, sizes, sexes and skin colors—from Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, the Nigerian underwear bomber, to Jose Padilla, the Hispanic-American accused of plotting a dirty bomb attack on American soil. Terrorists will find ways to avoid profiing, which is why Schneier argues that randomized secondary screening is more effective because it creates too much uncertainty and acts as a deterrent. "Focusing on a profile increases the risk that TSA agents will miss those who don’t match it," Schneier writes.

Schneier points out that what people really want when they argue for profiling are TSA agents who can apply judgement in their decisions of who to screen more carefully. And with controversial headlines about TSA agents patting down wheelchair-bound senior citizens (including, last week, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger) and four-year-old girls, who doesn't think TSA agents may be a little out of touch with reality. (Though TSA agents did just last week discover weapons in a child's stuffed animals and an elderly person's walker.) Unfortunately, Schneier points out it's unlikely TSA agents will be applying good judgment any time soon. "Judgment requires better-educated, more expert, and much-higher-paid screeners." Schneier writes. "And the personal career risks to a TSA agent of being wrong when exercising judgment far outweigh any benefits from being sensible."

As usual, Schneier does a good job arguing against "security theater" and for sensible security practices that strike the right balance between managing risk and allowing people to travel without fear of molestation.

by: Whit Richardson - Thursday, May 10, 2012

Have you ever dreamed of being a TSA baggage screener? To sit for hours at a time watching x-rayed images of carry-on luggage, trying to pick out the knife from among your clothes, toothbrush, laptop, shoes, belts, and whatever else you shove in there to avoid checking luggage? Me neither.

But someone thought it might be fun. I wasn't so sure when I saw a new game for my iPhone called Airport Scanner, which puts you in the TSA baggage screener's seat and purports to make airport security fun. In a press release, one of the game's creators said the company's goal "is to create unique games out of everyday life experiences that are fun and interesting." Have they visited an airport, I asked. What is "fun and interesting" about passing through a TSA security checkpoint?

Oh well, I paid the $0.99 to try it anyway. My report: It turns out it is sort of fun to pick out knives, ice skates, ninja stars, and sticks of dynamite from luggage. I'm not sure how long the game will keep my interest, but it's certainly entertaining for now.

by: Whit Richardson - Friday, April 20, 2012

Earlier this week, Kip Hawley, the former head of the Transportation Security Administration, proclaimed that "airport security in America is broken" in an editorial in The Wall Street Journal.

His commentary made a splash, as it should when any former official, whether public or private, criticizes the organization they once led. In it, he argued that the TSA needs to realize its job is "to manage risk, not to enforce regulations," and laid out the steps he believes would allow the TSA to be more effective at securing airports, while also re-winning the hearts and minds of the flying public.

However, the fact he's only speaking out about the TSA and its shortfalls now smacks of self-promotion. Evidenced by the fact that—surprise, surprise—it coincides with the publishing date (April 24) of his new book, Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security. As others have pointed out, Hawley is now espousing what TSA's detractors were saying during Hawley's tenure at the agency. Have the years of retrospection really given him a change of heart, or is it just easier to tell the truth when you're a free agent looking for consultant gigs rather than make the hard leadership decisions in the face of government bureaucracy?

I don't mean to be harsh on Hawley, but many of the changes he says are needed—more randomized security, no rigid lists of banned items, allow all liquids—are not new ideas. They're just ideas that have been hard to implement without proper leadership. To be fair, Hawley in his editorial acknowledges the mistake he made while at the agency's helm was being "naïve" about the TSA's "bureaucratic momentum and political pressures."

But while Hawley argues in his WSJ editorial that airport security is "broken," that doesn't mean he's admitting he made any mistakes during his tenure or that the TSA has failed its mission. On the contrary, in a virtual debate at The Economist's website last month Hawley argued the opposite, that the TSA's methods have worked. "Whatever perceived buffoonery takes place at checkpoints does not mitigate the cold reality that there are real attack plots and that TSA people all over the world, in concert with partners in industry and other government agencies, take action to prevent them," Hawley writes in his opening remarks in the debate. "Sometimes these actions are undecipherable and awkward, but they have worked."

So TSA's airport security measures "have worked," but now are "broken." At first glance, the ideas seem incongruous, but look closer and it's clear Hawley is talking about the stalled evolution of airport security strategies and risk management, which again is a result of government bureaucracy and the reality of politics. "The crux of the problem, as I learned in my years at the helm, is our wrongheaded approach to risk," he writes in the WSJ. "In attempting to eliminate all risk from flying, we have made air travel an unending nightmare for U.S. passengers and visitors from overseas, while at the same time creating a security system that is brittle where it needs to be supple."

From The Economist: "A better risk model against al-Qaeda-like attackers is to employ many changeable, flexible layers and make it simple for the defense to change measures while inflicting a dangerously high cost on would-be attackers who could never be sure what defense they were going to face on the day of their planned attack."

In his WSJ editorial, Hawley goes on to list several changes that the TSA—"if politicians gave the TSA some political cover"—could implement to make air travel safer and less burdensome for travelers.

Aside from obvious violent weapons, "no more banned items." "The list of banned items has created 'an Easter-egg hunt' mentality at the TSA," he writes. "Worse, banning certain items gives terrorists a complete list of what not to use in their next attack."

"Allow all liquids." Hawley claims the liquid ban was at first necessary to counter a known threat (al Qaeda's hydrogen-peroxide-based bombs), but that today "simple checkpoint signage, a small software update and some traffic management are all that stand between you and bringing all your liquids on every U.S. flight."

"Give TSA officers more flexibility and rewards for initiative, and hold them accountable." Hawley argues that the current system is too rigid and TSA supervisors should support personal initiative on the part of front-line TSA officers.

"Eliminate baggage fees." Hawley makes a good point that airlines instituting baggage fees have led passengers to stuff their carry-on items, which slows down checkpoints. But, as Scheier points out, that doesn't seem a viable option without Congress passing a law to that effect.

"Randomize security." "Predictability is deadly," Hawley writes. A painfully obvious point, but one Hawley felt compelled to press home given the TSA's reliance on such non-predictable things like banned-item lists and "rigid protocols." Of course, the TSA does introduce some randomness to airport security, such as behavior detection officers, air marshals and bomb-sniffing dogs, but Hawley doesn't believe they're enough.

To sum up his argument, Hawley writes: "Embracing a bit of risk could reduce the hassle of today's airport experience while making us safer at the same time."

While the ideas Hawley espouses in his editorial are all good ones, the harsh reality is that "embracing a bit of risk" is likely impossible when politicians are involved. Here's Bruce Schneier, one of the TSA's most outspoken critics, on the political dilemma: "It's in nobody's self-interest to take a stand for what might appear to be reduced security. Imagine that the TSA management announces a new rule that box cutters are now okay, and that they respond to critics by explaining that the current risks to airplanes don't warrant prohibiting them. Even if they're right, they're open to attacks from political opponents that they're not taking terrorism seriously enough. And if they're wrong, their careers are over.

"It's even worse when it's elected officials who have to make the decision. Which congressman is going to jeopardize his political career by standing up and saying that the cigarette lighter ban is stupid and should be repealed? It's all political risk, and no political gain."

So, airport security is "broken," travelers are fed up with the TSA, and no one has the political will or leadership to fix the problem. That's not a great diagnosis. It's clear the reforms have to be embraced by the citizens before the politicians and bureaucrats feel safe enough to touch them. Whether Hawley's public manifesto will fan the flames of anti-status quo sentiment enough to make a difference remains to be seen.

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by: Whit Richardson - Thursday, April 12, 2012

A school board in Colorado Springs, Colo., this week accepted the resignation of a school president and placed a high school principal on leave because of a botched handling of a security incident at the school.

The story reminded of a conversation I had several weeks ago with Paul Timm, president of RETA Security, a school security consulting firm in Illinois. I was writing this article about school security and the fact there is no Clery Act equivalent for K-12 public schools. Timm talked about the need for school administrators to take responsibility for the security of their schools, given the lack of effective enforcement. I quote him at length:

"The commitment always begins with administration. You could say that the commitment should begin with politicians and funding, and I agree, I want there to be funding as well. But if you're the administrator in a building, don't you have to make a commitment? I think there ought to be that kind of commitment coming from the superintendent and principal levels, that they're going to take a more proactive approach. And there are certain ways to do that. They're not popular, but if you're going to add teeth, I have a suggestion. You could make the evaluation of that administrator have a security component to it. So if they want a good annual review, they'll also be judged on how they handle safety and security. Instead of them dishing it off to facility manager ... they have to get involved and make it a collaborative effort. I think making it part of their evaluation would change things."

The news from Colorado offers an example of a school board taking security very seriously and holding the administrators responsible. The board didn't need to wait for an annual review to make their wishes know.

Here's what happened: The Classical Academy is a K-12 charter school in Colorado Springs that educates approximately 3,500 students on three campuses. Earlier this week, the school's board of directors accepted the resignation of the school's president and placed the high school principal on indefinite leave pending a review of a security incident that occurred on campus last week, according to The Gazette.

Apparently, the shake up all grew out of an incident where a student left two propane canisters in a backpack in a high school classroom. A serious threat, to be sure. However, school officials didn't react appropriately. Here's the Gazette:

"Officials turned off the valves on the canisters, declared them safe and put them in an office.

That was on April 2. Two days later, school officials suspended a student they believed was the person who left the backpacks and notified Academy School District 20."

When D-20 security officials arrived at TCA on April 5, they decided to call police. The police bomb squad used a robot to determine the devices were not explosive."

In the aftermath, school officials revealed that other items, described at a parents’ meeting as a science project, had been found in the school recently. The items included firecrackers and rubbing alcohol."

The school board said it will hire a full-time security director to be in charge of safety training for all students and staff, the newspaper said.

Do you think sending the school president packing and putting the principal on leave were the appropriate response to this situation?

 

by: Whit Richardson - Monday, March 26, 2012

The House committees on Oversight and Government Reform and Transportation and Infrastructure are today holding another joint hearing on the effectiveness of the Transportation Security Administration—the title of this post is how Transportation Committee Chairman John L. Mica (R-FL) approaches the hearings. Today's topics will include the TSA's full-body scanners, its behavioral detection officers and the TWIC program. Those testifying at the hearing include Christopher McLaughlin, the TSA's assistant administrator for security operations; Stephen Sadler, the TSA's assistant administrator for intelligence and analysis; and Rear Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, the U.S. Coast Guard's assistant commandant for marine safety, security and stewardship.

Following is a news release about the hearing from the office of Rep. Mica, a vocal critic of the TSA. Check back for an update from the hearing.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) program challenges and failures will be the focus of a joint hearing of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Monday.

This hearing will be led by Oversight Committee Chairman Darrell Issa (R-CA) and Transportation Committee Chairman John L. Mica (R-FL). Mica is also a senior member of the Oversight Committee. Both committees have focused on the need for significant TSA reform in order to improve transportation security and eliminate the waste of taxpayers’ money on ineffective or poorly implemented programs.

The focus of Monday’s hearing will include Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program, the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) program, and other security initiatives administered by the TSA. The Committees plan to continue conducting joint oversight hearings examining additional TSA issues in the coming months.

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by: Whit Richardson - Monday, March 12, 2012

More than a decade after 9/11, Congress in late February agreed to put in motion one of the major recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: The creation of the country's first nationwide interoperable emergency communications network for first responders. But the road to creating such a public safety communications network is still long, according to Gregg Riddle, president of the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International.

The bill was tucked into the payroll-tax-cut extension legislation that President Obama signed into law on Feb. 22. It included three critical elements: the allocation of 10 MHz of broadband spectrum, known as the D-Block; $7 billion in funding to facilitate the build-out of the nationwide network; and a governance model to oversee said build-out.

What's important for public safety officials to remember is that while long-term evolution (LTE) technology, the chosen technology for the national network, is currently available to allow for data sharing, it is at least five years away before it will be able to allow for one-to-many voice capabilities, Riddle told Security Director News. That means public safety officials have to think about what to do with their existing systems until those voice capabilities become available. "A lot of people thought we had voice and didn’t realize the first phase is only data, and thought they didn’t have to fund, maintain or upgrade land mobile radio for emergency communication," Riddle said. "That is one thing that everyone has to come to grips with."

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by: Whit Richardson - Friday, March 9, 2012

Update: The blogger behind the video, Jonathan Corbett, posts on his blog—comically named TSA Out of Our Pants!—that the TSA is trying to persuade mainstream journalists to not cover his video and claim he's found a fatal flaw in the full-body scanners.

There are plenty of TSA haters out there, but one vigilante took it upon himself to personally prove why he believes airport security in America is nothing but security theater. He claims to have discovered a serious flaw in the full-body imaging machines being deployed at U.S. airports around the country. Here's the video. Decide for yourself.

Jeffrey Goldberg over at The Atlantic directed my attention to the video. He also got a response from the TSA:

The video is a crude attempt to allegedly show how to circumvent TSA screening procedures. For obvious security reasons, we can't discuss our technology's detection capability in detail, however TSA conducts extensive testing of all screening technologies in the laboratory and at airports prior to rolling them out the field. Imaging technology has caught many items large and small, and is one of the most effective tools available to detect metallic and non-metallic items, such as the greatest threat to aviation, explosives.

TSA deploys a layered, risk-based approach to security through screening technologies and applying intelligence to our security measures in real time. Our nations' aviation system is safer now with the deployment of 600 imaging technology units at 140 airports. It is completely safe and the vast majority use a generic image that completely addresses privacy concerns.

-Whit Richardson

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